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Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard

This paper analyzes an adverse selection model in a credit market with the possibility of renegotiation.

Link	http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/st…cation/510_wp61_janda.pdf
Author	Janda, K
Date	2004
Institute	Institute of Economic Studies
Tags	bankruptcy, credit, market

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